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5 The Regulatory Interactions of the 
Lilliputians 
Our exploration of the Lilliputians' perceptions and their regulatory enforce-
ment style has brought us to the nature of the actual interactions they have 
with their regulated counterparts. The day-to-day experiences of the regula-
tors with the regulated community are central to understanding environmen-
tal regulation on the front lines, and Beth's story illuminates the importance 
of these regulatory interactions. 
For six years Beth worked for the division of hazardous waste at a state 
regulatory agency in the Western United States. Wanting to expand her 
understanding of the other environmental media, Beth recently accepted a 
position with the agency's surface water program. She has found surface 
water regulations to be much more challenging than the hazardous waste 
program because the regulations are not as descriptive as hazardous waste 
regulations and the regulated community population is far larger in the water 
program. Her state's office of surface water ensures compliance with the 
Clean Water Act, which mandates that bodies of water are swimmable and 
fishable. While some of her colleagues fill their days sampling streams, rivers, 
and lakes, she works directly with wastewater treatment plants. For her first 
few months, she was accompanied by a colleague and fellow regulator, Ted, 
to get her feet wet and receive on-the-job training. 
Beth learned very quickly from Ted that a positive, cooperative approach 
with the regulated community goes a long way. Ted stressed that it is best 
not to come across as a technocrat. Apparently, the regulator in the posi-
tion before her-Adam-was extremely technical, incapable of speaking in 
laymen's terms, and did not particularly enjoy dealing with the public or 
facilities; indeed, Beth had heard plenty of stories about the difficulties this 
regulator faced. For Beth, the job of a regulator consists of working coopera-
tively with regulated facilities to make sure they understand the regulations 
and to help them achieve and maintain regulatory compliance. Even though 
she is the regulator, Beth has learned that both parties-the regulator and the 
regulated-have to work together, for compliance and cooperation results 
in better outcomes than confrontation does (although that is not to say that 
confrontation cannot be useful from time to time). 
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Perhaps most reflective of Beth's approach is the nickname her regulatory 
counterparts have bestowed on her, "smiley"; however, she is embarrassed 
to reveal her nickname. Although many individuals might appreciate such 
a nickname, Beth is worried that if too many people, particularly in her 
agency, discover her nickname they might think she has been captured by 
the facilities she is supposed to regulate. A member of her former division 
was recently accused of looking the other way when it was revealed that a 
manufacturer was grossly mishandling hazardous wastes. According to the 
local news media, the only logical conclusion was that the state agency was 
in bed with business. Although Beth's nickname might fit her cooperative 
disposition, it is also potentially dangerous to outsiders who might assume 
she is in cahoots with the facilities she regulates. 
Even though the media portrayal of Beth and her colleagues generally is 
not positive, she maintains that if you have an "enforcer" attitude, you are 
likely to have tense, less productive interactions with a facility. But if you 
smile and provide helpful yet informative instructions, you are respected. 
Accordingly, the latter approach is preferred, leaving Beth with the positive 
outcomes she seeks. Over time, these positive interactions with the regulated 
community lead to good relationships, and these relationships frequently 
result in better environmental protection. 
As with Emily, the importance of perceptions helps to explain why Harry 
and the Lilliputians embrace a combination of intention-based and precision-
based regulatory styles. The Lilliputians' perceptions and regulatory style are 
also related to the interactions they have with facilities on a routine basis. 
Regulatory interactions in the U.S. environmental policy arena are generally 
thought to be adversarial (cf. Wallace 1995; Fiorino 2006; Eisner 2006; Ketti 
2002), which is understandable when we consider the power dynamics inher-
ent in the traditional regulatory model (Kagan 2004). Regulation, at its most 
basic level, creates tension between parties because one party commands 
another what to do through various incentive structures. These dynamics, 
combined with what we know from studies of front-line workers who dem-
onstrate the challenges they face working with their clients, the immediacy 
of their interactions, and the direct impact on the public/client groups, make 
these interactions difficult from the start (cf. Riccucci 2005; Lipsky 1980; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). 
This chapter examines the interactions between the Lilliputians and their 
regulatory counterparts. We discover that the interactions-at least from the 
regulators' perspective-counter commonly held perceptions that the U.S. 
environmental regulatory apparatus is adversarial. Instead, the regulatory 
interactions continuum we present at the end of this chapter provides support 
for the conclusion that the Lilliputians prefer cooperative interactions and are 
desirous, at least to some extent, of partnership with regulated facilities. 
Cooperation between the Lilliputians and the regulated community 
might be alarming to many outside the regulatory arena. Concerns arise that 
the Lilliputians might be captured by those they regulate because of their 
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"friendly" relationships. However, we argue here, in concert with others (cf. 
Cooper 2009; Makkai and Braithwaite 1992; Quirk 1981; Wilson 1980), 
that concerns of cozy relationships are overstated and positive interactions 
are desirable. 
LILLIPUTIANS AND THEIR REGULATORY INTERACTIONS 
Regulatory interactions are significant because it is the interactions of those 
individuals on the front lines of policy (cf. Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno 2003; Sandfort 2000; Riccucci 2005) and, more specifically, in 
regulatory contexts (cf. Hawkins 1984; Hutter 1997; Eisner 2006), in which 
the policy is actually carried out. In the context of regulation, compliance 
with environmental regulations-or any other type of regulation for that 
matter-is an ongoing process requiring routine, sometimes daily, interac-
tion between the parties (May 2002; Sparrow 2000; Ayers and Braithwaite 
1992). Regulators "put flesh on the regulatory skeleton" (Fineman 1998, 
969). Moreover, "the ambivalence, tensions, and dilemmas prompted by 
the opposing interests in regulation are continuously worked out in the ... 
decisions of field officers" (Hawkins 1984, 13 ). Accordingly, understanding 
these interactions is paramount in understanding environmental regulation. 1 
With the frequency and significance of these interactions, the regulators 
and the regulated community develop interdependence in a host of regula-
tory contexts (McCaffrey, Smith, and Martinez-Moyano 2007; Braithwaite 
1984; Hawthorne 2005; Khademian 1996, 2002; May and Wood 2003; 
Hutter 1997). And with interdependence comes expectations of one another 
and development of appropriate behaviors that define a regulatory culture 
(March, Schultz, and Zhou 2000; Meidinger 1987; Braithwaite 1995). Ulti-
mately, this interdependence and behavioral expectations can lead to posi-
tive interactions between the parties. 
Before investigating the benefits of positive regulatory interactions, let us 
consider what the Lilliputians have to say about their interactions. At this 
juncture, it is important to underscore a caveat of our work. We focus on the 
Lilliputians themselves, so, we are unable to provide insights here from the 
regulated community; therefore, our look at these regulatory interactions is 
only from the perspective of the regulators. However, with that said, it is still 
illuminating to consider the viewpoint of these regulators as they are half of 
the regulatory equation. 
We asked these environmental regulators about their interactions with 
the regulated community, and some of our findings defy common assump-
tions that they are power-hungry, tree-hugging regulators. Recall that it was 
noted in Chapter 3 that 86 percent of the Lilliputians agree their interactions 
with the regulated community are positive, while only 2 percent disagree ( 11 
percent are neutral).2 In comparison, 76 percent of Lilliputians disagree that 
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Table 5.1 Assessment of Regulatory Actions 
My interactions with 
the regulated community 
My interactions with 
regulated facilities are 
are generally positive best described as adversarial 
Strongly agree 14% 0% 
Agree 69% 4% 
Neither agree nor 11% 19% 
disagree 
Disagree 2% 50% 
Strongly disagree 0% 26% 
A state's commitment to environmental protection provides insight into 
these results. First, when we examine responses to the question about adver-
sarial encounters, regulators across all the states do not think that their inter-
actions are adversarial, but disagreement is most apparent in the trailblazer 
and mainstreamer states, in which regulators are more likely to characterize 
their interactions with the regulated community positively than regulators 
in lingerer states. One might expect states with stronger environmental per-
formance and capacity to have better interactions with the regulated com-
munity, as those interactions can translate into compliance achievements. In 
comparison, inquiries about positive interactions uncovered that regulators 
in states that are trailblazers and mainstreamers report the strongest positive 
interactions. The takeaway from these questions is the vast majority of state 
environmental regulators report that their regulatory interactions are good 
and most regulators do not think their interactions are adversarial. With the 
strong support for positive interactions, our focus shifts to the benefits that 
might result from good interactions. 
BENEFITS OF POSITIVE REGULATORY INTERACTIONS 
The following discussion suggests that positive interactions between regula-
tors and the regulated community enable the realization of several benefits 
that enhance compliance. Further, we argue that adversarial interactions, 
wrought with tension, can transition into positive, productive relationships. 
Consider some of the advantages of positive interactions. 
First, positive interactions lead to improved communication between the 
parties. Dialogue and open communication are fundamental to good regu-
latory interactions (Axelrod 1984, 1997; Posner 2000). If members of the 
regulated community and the regulator have helpful and constructive inter-
actions, then the regulator is going to be more forthcoming with informa-
tion, as will the regulated community (Pautz 2009a, 2009b). Information 
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asymmetry is rampant in environmental regulation, so the opportunity to 
narrow the knowledge gap will improve communication. Individuals at reg-
ulated facilities are frequently the ones who possess information about the 
latest pollution abatement technology, whereas the regulators are generally 
the individuals who can best explain the complexities of intricate regula-
tions. With the reduction of information disparities, more open and honest 
communication is likely (Pautz and Wamsley forthcoming). 
The Lilliputians reveal that information disclosure is not as much of an 
issue as traditional understandings of regulatory interactions might lead 
one to conclude. Only 11 percent of regulators indicate that it is difficult 
to obtain information from the regulated community, while a majority (53 
percent) of regulators state that it is not difficult at all to obtain information 
(see Table 5.2). These results appear to be commonsensical as many of these 
regulators repeatedly indicate the desire to have positive interactions. Yet the 
Lilliputians are less enthusiastic about relying on the regulated community for 
insights and ideas concerning environmental protection. As such, discussions 
surrounding innovations in environmental policy often mention utilizing the 
expertise of the regulated community, which goes to openness in dialogue 
and information disclosure in the regulatory interactions. Accordingly, regu-
lators were asked about relying on the regulated community for insights and 
ideas. Forty-one percent of regulators thought the regulated community could 
be relied on, while 19 percent disagreed. Here, it is important to note that 
a significant portion of regulators-40 percent-was neutral in response to 
this question. This finding might indicate a significant amount of uncertainty 
among regulators for reliance on the regulated community for insights. 
A closer analysis of these results regarding open communication and 
information disclosure finds that environmental media is an explanatory 
factor. 3 The Lilliputians who work in air or waste stressed that it is not dif-
ficult to receive information from facilities, and they can rely on the regu-
lated community for new and innovative ideas. Perhaps this is because the 
Lilliputians who work within air or waste have complex regulations that 
Table 5.2 Obtaining Information 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
It is hard to get 
information about 








rely on the regulated 
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have compelled them to work more closely with the regulated community 
to help them understand regulatory complexity. 
Second, with improved communication, cooperation is enhanced. 
More open communication encourages individuals to be more forthcom-
ing, and positive interactions characterized by cooperation are far more 
likely (McCaffrey et al. 2007; Pautz and Wamsley forthcoming). With the 
improved dialogue comes better understandings of one another and there 
is less tendency to cheat, deceive, and manipulate the regulatory interac-
tion (McCaffrey et al. 2007; Pautz and Wamsley forthcoming; Pautz 2009a, 
2009b). Additionally, enhanced cooperation leads to the resolution of con-
flict more easily (Kagan 2001). Since patterns of good communication and 
responsiveness have been established, when problems arise the parties are 
far better equipped (because of this shared history) to respond cooperatively 
and productively to the issue and resolve it with less conflict, thereby reduc-
ing adversarialism. Ultimately, cooperation in these relationships is desirable 
as parties come to have shared views and common goals (Gambetta 1988). 
A significant majority, 83 percent, of the Lilliputians say their interactions 
with the regulated community are cooperative, whereas a mere 2 percent 
disagree.4 Cooperative interactions are hardly the expectation in regulatory 
interactions, given the common narrative that regulators are power hungry 
and eager to assert their environmentalism. An examination of Lilliputians' 
education helps to illuminate these results.5 More specifically, Lilliputians 
with a bachelor's degree or higher were most likely to stress that their inter-
actions are cooperative. Since the majority of the regulators in this study 
have an undergraduate degree and some graduate work, it may be difficult 
to draw too many conclusions from this linkage; however, we might sug-
gest that with additional education and training regulators may not find the 
regulated community so hostile. 
Finally, enhanced communication and cooperative interactions strengthen 
regulatory culture, which facilitates compliance. Over time the interac-
tions of the regulator and the regulated community cultivate mutual norms 
and expectations that are built on respect and trust of one another, which 
ultimately promotes compliance (Braithwaite 1995, 229). Therefore, it is 
understandable that a "substantial amount" of a regulator's time is "spent 
creating and preserving good relations" with facility officials (Hawkins 
1984, 42). Yet, "the notion that the regulatory culture enhances compliance 
through social bonds between the regulatees and the regulators goes against 
traditional concerns about the capture of the regulators by those who they 
are supposed to be regulating" (Braithwaite 1995, 228). 
Given the nature of our findings, we cannot provide empirical evidence 
of improved regulatory culture; however, if we recall the Lilliputians' per-
ceptions of the regulated community, we see encouraging signs of improve-
ments in regulatory culture. As noted in Chapter 3, some regulators hold 
the perception that most members of the regulated community intend to 
comply with regulations. Moreover, 83 percent of regulators have positive 
The Regulatory Interactions of the Lilliputians 79 
interactions with them. Although we cannot make conclusions regarding the 
directionality of the influence, we think there are indications of productive 
working relationships built on communication and cooperation. 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE BEST INTERACTIONS 
To reinforce our discussion of regulatory interactions and the benefits of 
positive interactions, we come back to the nature of the actual interactions 
between the Lilliputians and the regulated community and consider how 
regulators describe them. Table 5.3 demonstrates that regulators say the best 
interactions occur when they and their facility counterpart cooperate with 
one another (93 percent agreed). 
These results appear reasonable, and a Lilliputian from New Hampshire 
reminds us why the willingness to work together is essential: 
Don't be the stereotypical pointy[-nosed] bureaucrat. Try to speak the 
regulated party's language or find some common ground. They will take 
you more seriously and try to work with you if they see you as genu-
ine and reasonable. You can accomplish a great deal if they like (but 
respect) you, trust you, and are willing to work with you. Remember, 
as a government regulator, those you regulate also pay taxes that pro-
vide your wages. Always treat the regulated community with respect. 
In-your-face tactics are usually not necessary, well received, or effective. 
Wear the white hat until you need to wear the black hat. If you are a 
good regulator, you will know when it is time to display and use regula-
tory authority. Word spreads in the regulatory community. 
We also consider an alternative to cooperative interactions by asking Lilli-
putians if the best interactions occur when facility personnel recognize that 
Table 5.3 Best Interactions 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
The best interactions 
occur when facility 
personnel and myself 







The best interactions 
occur when facility 
personnel recognize that 
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Figure 5.1 Interactions Continuum. 
regulators are the authority. Only 32 percent of the regulators agreed that 
interactions were the best when they are recognized as the authority, and 27 
percent of regulators disagreed. 
However, the largest response group was neutral (40 percent). These 
results may indicate that although regulators prefer cooperation, they also 
retain the ability to be more authoritative and employ regulatory sticks as 
the need arises. Chapter 4's insights regarding regulatory enforcement style, 
along with other research that indicates mixed approaches to working with 
the regulated community, corroborate these findings. So far, we have seen 
some of the many dimensions of regulatory interactions, and the next sec-
tion pulls together what we have learned about the interactions from the 
Lilliputians' point of view by offering a way to think more holistically about 
these interactions. 
CONTINUUM OF REGULATORY INTERACTIONS 
Regulatory interactions are complex, and classifying them-as is the case 
with regulatory enforcement styles-into either/or categories, is insufficient 
as it negates the complexity of these interactions. In an effort to advance 
our understanding of regulatory interactions, we developed a continuum to 
more succinctly categorize the interactions of the Lilliputians that allows for 
a more thorough look at the interactions of the regulators, but also presents 
a concise way of understanding the differences in regulatory interactions. We 
categorized the regulators into one of four categories based on their responses 
to questions associated with their regulatory interactions (see Figure 5.1 ). 
There are four categories in this regulatory interactions continuum: 
adversarial, cordial skepticism, cautious cooperation, and partnership. 6 In 
the following pages, we investigate these categories from the perspective of 
the Lilliputian? 
REGULATORY INTERACTIONS: ADVERSARIAL 
On the left side of the continuum (see Figure 5.1), we begin with a cat-
egory of interactions labeled adversarial. One percent of the Lilliputians 
fit this grouping because their day-to-day interactions with members of the 
regulated community are extremely difficult. The Lilliputians said outright 
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that their interactions are adversarial and not defined by cooperation. Fur-
ther, regulators in this category are likely to see themselves as authority 
figures who demand compliance from regulated facilities or else there will 
be a litany of unpleasant consequences. Interactions are difficult from the 
regulator's point of view because the regulated community is not forthright 
with information and appears unwilling to communicate openly and hon-
estly with the regulator. These communication challenges leave the regulator 
doubtful about what members of the regulated community tell the regulator. 
Moreover, the regulator is likely to question the regulated entity's motives 
associated with compliance, and the regulator adopts a mantra of triple-
checking everything associated with this facility. Accordingly, these interac-
tions often may be defined by confrontation, and the regulator is unlikely to 
hesitate about exercising threats and other more punitive means to maintain 
compliance. 
As a result of these characteristics, there is not likely to be much of a 
relationship between the two parties, and it is doubtful the Lilliputian is 
going to do much to promote cooperation with his regulatory counterpart. 
Instead, the interaction will continue along as is and may even get worse 
since interaction after interaction is riddled with uncertainties which breed 
distrust. Remember Beth claimed her predecessor, Adam, could have been 
defined as one of the Lilliputians who has adversarial interactions with the 
regulated community. Beth reflected that Adam would never want to be in 
the presence of those he regulates and would spend the minimum amount 
of time necessary engaged with them. More fundamentally, Adam believed 
all facilities were bad. As a result, Beth learned from the same facilities that 
they had a strong dislike for Adam because of his actions. 
After considering the description of this type of interaction, we should 
reiterate that only 1 percent of the regulators here fall into this category. In 
other words, 99 percent of the Lilliputians' interactions with the regulated 
community are not defined by adversarialism, despite some inaccurate pre-
sumptions about these regulatory interactions. Within the 1 percent, water 
regulators have the most adversarial relationship within our sample, but it 
is important to note that with a small number of regulators in this category, 
it is difficult to draw conclusions about the various factors that explain the 
individuals in this category. 
REGULATORY INTERACTIONS: CORDIAL SKEPTICISM 
Lilliputians whose regulatory interactions are more positive than those 
defined by adversarialism fit into the category of interactions defined by 
cordial skepticism. Thirty percent of the regulators fall into this second cat-
egory of regulatory interactions. Unlike the interactions of regulators and 
the regulated community in the adversarial category, these interactions may 
not be quite so confrontational. Communication and information sharing 
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are still likely to be strained in this category, thereby making interactions 
challenging, but there is some disclosure. The regulator may have experi-
ences with the facility in which the regulated community sometimes dis-
closes needed information freely, and other times obtaining information is 
more difficult. 
For example, during a facility inspection, a regulator may request infor-
mation, such as monitoring reports, and her regulatory counterpart might 
provide the information, but only after a specific request. And, if a print-
ing operation, for instance, began working with a new ink supplier that 
impacted its emissions data, the facility official may not be as inclined to 
volunteer information for fear of the regulator finding fault with the emis-
sions data. As a result, cooperation ebbs and flows; sometimes the parties 
are cooperative and other times they are not. Therefore, these interactions 
are far more pleasant than those defined by adversarialism-indeed, they 
may even be cordial-but they have their obstacles, leading toward some 
skepticism on the part of the regulator. 
Over time, these interactions may improve, albeit slightly, because the 
nature of the interactions is less predictable. Regulators may have a pleas-
ant encounter and experience a facility that is forthright with information 
one day and then find a disagreeable facility the next time. As a result, 
the interactions are likely to be cordial, but characterized by skepticism, as 
they are unpredictable. To reiterate, 30 percent of the Lilliputians fall into 
this category of interactions, which is not surprising given the variability 
of the regulatory enforcement styles uncovered in the last chapter. We find 
it encouraging, though, that 69 percent of the regulators in this study have 
more productive and cooperative interactions. Water and waste regulators 
are the most likely groups of regulators to have interactions characterized by 
cordial skepticism for reasons that are unclear; and, unfortunately, no other 
explanatory variables proved to be statistically significant. 
REGULATORY INTERACTIONS: CAUTIOUS COOPERATION 
The third continuum category, cautious cooperation, includes the Lillipu-
tians who have somewhat positive interactions with their regulatory coun-
terparts, but are cautious, perhaps because of previous difficult encounters 
or simply because these regulators can ultimately wield the proverbial regu-
latory stick. As a regulator from Rhode Island reminds us, "Often my inter-
actions go well with those I regulate, but there is still room for a bad day." 
A significant majority, 61 percent, of the regulators fall into this category of 
regulatory interactions. These regulators experience generally cooperative 
interactions with their regulatory counterparts, but, as the Lilliputian from 
Rhode Island reminded, bad interactions can happen; therefore, regulators 
would not go so far as to say their interactions are often positive and coop-
erative. 
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Interactions in this category generally have good communication, infor-
mation sharing, and cooperation. Both parties disclose information readily, 
and the regulated facilities typically are forthcoming with information, par-
ticularly when compliance issues arise. Additionally, the parties look to each 
other to cooperatively achieve and maintain compliance with regulations. 
Regulators in this category typically have good interactions with their coun-
terparts in the regulated community, but those interactions may vary. There 
is not complete information disclosure or open communication. Therefore, a 
regulator still retains some caution in his or her interactions with regulatory 
counterparts; thus, cooperation is cautious. 
It is not surprising, based on what we have learned thus far about envi-
ronmental regulators, that the majority of the Lilliputians fall in this cat-
egory. Accordingly, there is little in the way of further insights from various 
factors, including environmental media or type of state agency, since the 
majority of regulators fall into this category. We are encouraged that so 
many regulators generally have positive, cooperative interactions with the 
regulated community because, as we have seen, regulatory compliance is 
frequently the result of ongoing interactions between the parties and posi-
tive interactions have the potential to lead to better relationships and maybe 
even innovation (Pautz and Wamsley forthcoming). 
REGULATORY INTERACTIONS: PARTNERSHIP 
Building upon the regulatory interactions that are cooperative, an additional 
7 percent of regulators fall into the partnership category. From the point of 
view of regulators in this category, their interactions are superb, as they look 
to members of the regulated community not as adversaries but as partners 
in achieving environmental protection. Hallmarks of this category of inter-
actions include the free flow of information between the parties and open, 
honest communication. The willingness of both sides to provide information 
and collaboratively address issues builds trust between them and establishes 
a solid foundation for cooperation. Over time, this cooperation leads to 
more than just productive interactions; it leads to partnership (Pautz and 
Wamsley forthcoming). 
With a long-standing, positive relationship replete with cooperation, open 
communication, and information disclosure, seemingly significant issues are 
dealt with differently. One local municipality encountered a problem with 
one of its underground storage tanks, and it was not completely confident 
about what to do. The official decided it would be best if she called her 
regulator and asked for help. According to the facility official, the regulator 
was great and they worked together to stop the leak and devise a plan to 
prevent future leaks from the town's underground storage tanks. The regula-
tor was more than happy to help and appreciated that the official from the 
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they had built a good relationship in which both were straightforward with 
the other and worked together to maintain environmental protection. This 
example demonstrates that good interactions over time serve to reinforce 
positive experiences. After a history of positive interactions, the facility offi-
cial wasted no time in calling her regulator to help address a compliance 
problem. Because the regulator worked well with the facility official, their 
relationship grew and attributes of their partnership were further solidified. 
Only a small percentage of the Lilliputians (7 percent) fall into this cat-
egory, but that is expected. For a regulator to be in this category of the inter-
actions continuum, her experiences with the regulated community would 
have to be overwhelmingly positive the vast majority of the time; yet we 
know regulators frequently encounter the proverbial "bad apple" (Bardach 
and Kagan 2002). Moreover, partnerships take time to cultivate, and we 
suspect regulators are hesitant to admit such strong relationships with their 
regulatory counterparts. 
REGULATORY INTERACTIONS: UNDERSTANDING 
THEDRDnNGFACTORS 
Based on the continuum of regulatory interactions we established, we are 
encouraged to find 68 percent of the regulators in this study have interac-
tions defined by cautious compliance and partnership. And only 1 percent 
of the Lilliputians have tense, adversarial interactions. The majority of the 
Lilliputians, therefore, have positive interactions with the regulated com-
munity, at least from their point of view. Before we continue with our argu-
ments in favor of positive working relationships between the Lilliputians 
and the individuals they regulate, we first examine what factors explain 
where a regulator sits on the regulatory interactions continuum. 
A Lilliputian's gender, education, and state agency's commitment to 
environmental protection provide important explanations for the driving 
elements of how regulators are categorized on the regulatory interactions 
continuum. First, when examining the differences between men and women, 
recall from Chapter 2 that 68 percent of the regulators are men. Many 
women have daily interactions, such as Emily did in Chapter 3, in which 
they confront skepticism from their regulatory counterparts; therefore, they 
are most likely to experience interactions that are cordial, but are also met 
with skepticism. Accordingly, interactions are often difficult until the facil-
ity official and the regulator begin to trust one another, possibly leading to 
a cooperative relationship. Conversely, men more frequently fell into the 
cautious cooperation classification-perhaps because male regulators fit the 
expectation of the regulated community. These findings are commonsensi-
cal since the vast majority of our respondents are men; thus, they have been 
able to forge a cooperative relationship over time and may not encounter the 
gender stereotypes that plague women regulators. 8 Yet conclusions about 
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the influence of gender on the nature of regulatory interactions must be met 
with caution given the disproportionate number of men in our study. 
The educational attainment of regulators is another important driving 
element of the continuum. A regulator with a bachelor's degree or some 
graduate work generally finds his interactions defined by cordial skepticism, 
whereas individuals with a doctorate or professional degree (for example, a 
law degree) or high school diploma are more apt to have interactions that 
embody those of cautious cooperation. One might expect that additional 
education promotes more cooperative interactions, but that is not the case 
here-indeed, the relationship between education and types of interaction 
is a bit erratic. We attribute these findings to the fact that the majority of 
Lilliputians have college degrees and some graduate education. 
Although it might seem that a state's environmental commitment and 
capacity is important to understanding the continuum, one of the more 
interesting findings is that the classification of state environmental regula-
tory agencies (as trailblazers, mainstreamers, and lingerers) does not explain 
regulators' placement in the cautious cooperation category on the contin-
uum of regulatory interactions, as might be expected. These findings seem to 
counter the presumption that there are large notable differences in terms of 
environmental protection between states that are trailblazers and lingerers. 
These findings also reveal that the regulators on the front lines may be 
sufficiently insulated from management's influence and the political forces 
exerted on their agency. Front-line workers in other contexts have been 
found to be fairly removed from the influence of management (Riccucci 
2005). In summary, regulators are generally positive about their interactions 
with members of the regulated community, but are still somewhat cautious 
in their interactions since their job in the existing regulatory regime is to 
verify compliance and enforce regulations. Our findings align with other 
studies of environmental regulators that find the interactions are far more 
positive than commonly presumed (cf. May and Winter 2011; May 2005; 
Pautz 2009a, 2009b). 
Additionally, it is worth noting, in terms of positive interactions and 
desirability, where along the continuum most of the regulators fall. If we 
consider the continuum in terms of the left side representing more negative 
interactions and the right side representing more positive interactions, we 
discover 31 percent of the Lilliputians seem to have negative interactions, 
whereas 68 percent appear to have positive interactions. Admittedly, this 
is a simplistic division, but it does demonstrate that more regulators have 
positive interactions than negative, and we argue the tendency is toward 
more positive interactions. The distribution along the regulatory continuum 
is encouraging as we look at the broader context of environmental policy 
shifting from first-generation policies that are predicated on more adver-
sarial encounters in favor of next-generation policies that necessitate closer 
ties between the Lilliputians and members of the regulated community. If we 
continue with the presumption that positive interactions are more likely to 
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result in better outcomes (as discussed in the opening pages of this chapter), 
let us now contemplate another facet of positive regulatory interactions-
trust-as a mechanism for improving these relationships over time. 
TRUST AND REGULATORY INTERACTIONS 
Again, we contend, along with others (cf. Pautz and Rinfret 2011; Scholz 
1991; Ayers and Braithwaite 1992; May and Wood 2003; Pautz 2009b), 
that positive regulatory interactions are desirable. However, positive interac-
tions do not materialize automatically between parties; rather, they take time 
to cultivate. Pautz and Wamsley (forthcoming) argue that trust provides a 
key component to regulatory interactions. Within our study, we build on 
this argument, suggesting that trust might be an additional vehicle to both 
explain and improve regulatory interactions. 
But before we explore trust in this context, we must start with understand-
ing trust even though a commonly agreed upon definition is elusive (Kramer 
1999, 571; Rousseau et al. 1998). Of the many definitions of trust, several 
often-cited ones merit consideration. Gambetta (1988) states that trust is "the 
probability that [a person] will perform an action that is beneficial or at least 
not detrimental to [themselves and] is high enough ... to consider engaging in 
some form of cooperation with [another]" (217). Mayer, Davis, and Schoor-
man ( 199 5) maintain trust is "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trust or, irrespective of the ability to moni-
tor or control that other party" (712). Rousseau et al. (1998) define trust as 
"a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (395). Shaw 
(1997) views trust as the "belief that those on whom we depend will meet our 
expectations of them" (21). Moreover, trust does not simply exist or not exist; 
rather, it exists in varying degrees along a continuum (Thomas 1998). 
We contend that the aforementioned aspects of trust could have a role in 
the environmental regulatory system. In particular, the conditions or behav-
iors associated with trust (vulnerability, risk, and dependence) are unques-
tionably part of the relationships between regulators and the individuals 
at the facilities they regulate. For example, a regulator is dependent on a 
facility for accurate information regarding outputs and emissions monitor-
ing. The regulator faces some degree of risk and vulnerability when rely-
ing on the regulated community for information in making a compliance 
determination. From the other perspective, facility personnel assume risk 
and vulnerability when they openly communicate with their inspector about 
compliance problems. Moreover, facility personnel frequently depend on 
inspectors for interpretation of regulations and requirements. 
Along with Ketti (2002) and Fiorino (2006), who contend that a signifi-
cant issue in the current environmental regulatory regime is the lack of trust, 
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we asked the Lilliputians about trust of their regulatory counterparts. Sixty-
five percent of the Lilliputians profess a "high level of trust" with those they 
regulate. Forty-four percent of the Lilliputians said they trust the facilities 
they work with 100 percent of the time, and 46 percent of the Lilliputians 
trust facilities more than half of the time.9 Only 8 percent of the regulators 
trust facilities less than half the time. We were rather surprised to find such 
widespread statements of trust in the regulated community from the regula-
tors, particularly in light of common presumptions about regulatory interac-
tions and hostility.10 These insights about levels of trust the Lilliputians have 
in their regulatory counterparts are intriguing and fit within a more recent 
avenue of inquiry in regulatory interactions; however, since our focus was 
more broadly aimed, we encourage future, more specific research into this 
dimension. We concur with Axelrod (1984), Posner (2001), and others who 
maintain that positive regulatory interactions and trust are interrelated (see 
also Pautz and Wamsley forthcoming). 
Inevitably, an underlying concern is whether positive interactions between 
the regulator and the regula tee raise concerns of regulatory capture. We have 
argued (along with others) that there are benefits to positive regulatory inter-
actions, and we are encouraged to find a significant majority of the Lillipu-
tians have positive interactions with their regulatory counterparts. Yet there 
is a counterargument that must be considered about positive interactions. If 
a regulator's encounters with the regulated community are cooperative and 
positive, are they positive because the regulator is lax because she has been 
captured by industry? The final section of this chapter turns to concerns of 
capture. We contend that agency capture, if present, is minimal, which is in 
keeping with numerous other studies that fail to uncover an empirical basis 
for capture (cf. Makkai and Braithwaite 1992; Quirk 1981; Wilson 1980) 
despite the seemingly prevalent tendencies toward capture. 
CAPTURING THE LILLIPUTIANS? STEMMING 
CONCERNS REGARDING POSITIVE INTERACTIONS 
Remember Beth was concerned that her nickname, "smiley," might suggest 
that she is too lenient and chummy with the individuals she regulates. The 
findings from this chapter might lead to the conclusion that if a regulator 
has cooperative, positive interactions with individuals at regulated facili-
ties-and garners a nickname like Beth's-then a Lilliputian might become 
captured, negatively impacting the implementation of environmental policy. 
Although fears of regulatory capture are understandable, we argue that 
they are overstated. But first we offer an explanation of capture. A perva-
sive fear that a regulator will succumb to the regulated community is the 
essence of capture. More formally, Bernstein (1955) says regulatory capture 
occurs when regulators become beholden to those they attempt to regulate. 
Furthermore, a regulatory agency or regulator could succumb to the control 
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of a range of outside influences from the community it is responsible for 
regulating. We concur with Cooper (2009), who asserts that "The simplistic 
version of capture suggests that the regulated industry simply takes control 
of the regulatory agency through a variety of means such that, as journalists 
frequently put it, the 'watchdog' becomes the 'lapdog'" (Cooper 2009, 11). 
Fears of capture permeate all regulatory arenas, not just environmental 
policy, yet definitive conclusions about its presence remain elusive. Indeed, 
Kaufman's (1960) widely read account of the U.S. Forest Service spurs grave 
concerns of capture. And, as the Lilliputians' interactions with the regulated 
community progress from ones defined by adversarialism to interactions 
defined by partnership, many outsiders, including politicians and the media, 
would suggest that regulatory capture is all but inevitable. Fears of capture 
stem from a host of concerns, including worries that a regulator will behave 
a certain way in the hopes of securing a job with industry or concerns that a 
regulator is simply complacent and ambivalent about the regulatory appara-
tus he or she is tasked with enforcing or even that a regulator is sympathetic 
to industry (cf. Makkai and Braithwaite 1992). 
Although concerns of regulatory capture are not entirely unfounded, "in 
crude terms, the idea of capture is a dramatic overstatement or even simply 
inaccurate and also an insult that impugns the integrity of many good people 
who have spent their careers working for public interest in regulatory agen-
cies" (Cooper 2009, 11). Wilson (1980) and Quirk (1981), among others, 
argue that regulatory capture is not common, and Makkai and Braithwaite 
(1992) find the presence of regulatory capture to be weak and situational. 
Croley (2008) not only refutes regulatory capture but points to how well the 
public interest has been served by regulatory bodies and their regulators. In 
the context of environmental regulation, we, too, raise doubts that capture 
should be an overriding concern with regulators. 
The very essence of regulatory capture fears presumes the worst of civil 
servants and assumes that they are not ethical actors. Chapter 3 explored the 
common assumption that regulators simply sit around sipping their lattes, 
determining who to regulate; this portrait paints a dismal picture of regula-
tors. However, despite this portrait, the vast majority of civil servants are 
upstanding, ethical individuals committed to their work serving the public 
(Goodsell 2004; Croley 2008; Mosher 1982). Inevitably there is the occa-
sional regulator who disgraces the public service through unethical actions, 
but this is far from the norm. Often the tendency in the United States is to 
condemn public servants, yet day-to-day experiences remind us that the vast 
majority of civil servants serve the public despite the rampant bureaucrat 
bashing (Goodsell2004). In terms of environmental regulators more specifi-
cally, we have seen thus far-particularly in Chapter 2-that the Lilliputians 
are dedicated public servants who are committed to their work and believe 
in the good that is achieved through environmental regulations. 
The preceding discussion has called into question the concerns of cap-
ture regarding the insights about regulatory interactions from this chapter. 
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With the cooperative interactions the Lilliputians report in this study, the 
argument could be made that there is an opportunity to embrace more self-
regulatory techniques in this policy realm as we look to the future of envi-
ronmental regulations. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chapter presents important implications for environmental policy. Even 
though there is much conjecture regarding the interactions environmental 
regulators have with the regulated community, we find those interactions 
are understudied. This chapter sheds light on these interactions from a wide 
array of regulators across the United States. Moreover, these findings pro-
vide insights into perceptions of and experiences with the regulated commu-
nity, which are important for our final chapter, which considers alternatives 
to the traditional approach of command and control regulations in envi-
ronmental policy. To help synthesize our findings, we present the regula-
tory interactions continuum as a foundation for understanding the future of 
regulatory interactions for state environmental regulators and the way they 
interact with facilities. 
This chapter reveals that the Lilliputians have varying and complex inter-
actions with the regulated community, and these interactions are important 
to understand because of the discretion regulators exercise in their daily 
work protecting the environment. When they are in the field assessing com-
pliance, these regulators exercise discretion, which helps explain the different 
characterizations of regulatory interactions. Undoubtedly, the interactions 
these regulators have regarding the regulated community will impact their 
decisions in the field. 
A key finding from this chapter is that environmental regulators across 
17 states generally have positive interactions with the regulated community. 
Although 1 percent of the Lilliputians' interactions might be adversarial and 
difficult, the message is that state environmental regulators might generally 
have positive interactions, which is important for environmental protection. 
Common perceptions of these regulatory interactions would have us think 
that these interactions are mostly on the left side of the regulatory interac-
tions continuum, but our findings indicate the opposite: 68 percent of the 
Lilliputians have regulatory interactions on the right side of the continuum, 
and only 1 percent describe negative interactions. 
In summary, the demands on front-line workers like Patricia Gary 
' ' Emily, Harry, and Beth will certainly be different as next-generation policies 
are adopted, and these next-generation policies are more fully explored in 
the final chapter. But we see here that the Lilliputians and their regulatory 
counterparts work together and can trust one another (Potoski and Prakash 
2004, 154 ). In their discussions about the transition in environmental pol-
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trust are needed among regulators and the regulated community. Moreover, 
Potoski and Prakash (2004) discuss how next-generation environmental 
policies require former adversaries, who have been conditioned to detest 
the other because of the powers one party exerts over the other, to work 
together and trust one another (Potoski and Prakash 2004, 154). Acco~d­
ingly, the perceptions, style, and interactions front~line re?ulators ~ave w1th 
regard to the regulated community must be cons1dered m any sh1ft of the 
environmental regulatory structure. 
6 Recognizing the Unnoticed 
The Evolving Role of the Lilliputians 
Although individual environmental regulators might not find themselves 
capturing the daily headlines of major newspapers, one does not have 
to look far to uncover news stories of regulators collectively facing the 
wrath of politicians, the regulated community, environmental interest 
groups, and the public. Nationwide, the 2012 Republican Party presi-
dential primary process compelled several candidates to promise closure 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency if elected. New regula-
tions from the EPA regarding the operation of older, coal-fired power 
plants are reinvigorating the jobs-versus-environment debate. These 
more recent stories come not long after the Deepwater Horizon drilling 
platform in the Gulf of Mexico exploded, sank, and released more than 
200 million gallons of oil. The Minerals Management Service (MMS), 
once part of the Department of the Interior, found itself facing signifi-
cant scrutiny and numerous scandals-many related to poor execution 
of its responsibilities pertaining to the oil rig and some unrelated-and 
was ultimately restructured. 1 
While these news stories merit attention, this coverage fails to distin-
guish the scandals and their causes from the day-to-day work of front-
line regulators. Of course, there are instances of front-line regulators 
shirking their responsibilities and neglecting the public's best interest, 
yet more often than not, these news stories and subsequent investiga-
tions find the blame lies beyond the front lines of the agency. Scan-
dals and general disdain for regulation often result in the conflation of 
many important distinctions, such as the roles of political appointees 
and front-line regulators, and this does damage to the images of all 
government regulators. 2 From this media coverage, we get an image of 
environmental regulators who are not protecting the environment, but 
rather are trying to protect industries, and exemplifying corrupt behav-
ior. Although these monikers may indeed be appropriate in some cases, 
what image of Lilliputians is conveyed to the public? As we have seen, 
many negative characterizations have led to false assumptions about 
front-line regulators. 
